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·I. Introl\ucticn 
be  approe.olted  . . .  ... 
•. 
_.-.  ~  .. ;  ..  .-~..  . 
Viewed:frooti  th~ angle  o:f-th~ Co~unity, there is 
harmtmi.?Oe  nan<:.nal.tax systems.  Tax l'aws  and  tax rules are adapted to  .... 
policy objectives.. ni is the task of tax narmonization policy to adjust· ila.,..· 
tional tax sYl!tems  and  tax·l~ws to the objectives of economic,~  social and . 
tical fntegfation iri the Commtinity.  This  does  not 1  however,  mean unification 
.or· taxation·  no  "l'art pour l'e.rt" is intended. 
from the point of view of the  l•fember  States1  we  have to start 
fact  that taxes  are  no  longer neut;!;'al .revenue-raisers  •  ... \  '  . . .  '  . 
they have  become  instruments  for  poli'cy on stabiiisation,  on distribution ·of 
private income,  on~he al~ocation of resources  betwe~n public and private 
sectors• as  well as  betw~en regions and industries  • 
.  , .. 
As ...  other Community policies the  tax.·h~rmonization policy als«:)  has  .. 
solutions which  are acceptable to Member  States and to  . 
as  well.  .  . 
.• 
2.  It is  ~omew~at surprising that there is oply on~ clause in the Rome 
which  explicitly mentions harmonization of taxes. in the Community.  --..  ' 
Article 99  a..'ld  even here the only reference is to the· h&·motdzation Qf 
,·,· 
taxes,  the most  important  of which  are turnover taxes and excise duties. 
Article 99  requires the Commission to propose '"ays  and means  of harmonizing 
national legislation on  indirect taxes  in s.:>  far as this is in the interest . 
of the  CO:':l.':lon  !·!a.rket.  Hm·rever,  the fact that the Treaty does  not  ex~licitly 
mention  harmo~ization of direct taxes  does  not  mean  that the Treaty does  rio~ 
provide a  "oasis  :for this being done.  Authority for. action in the  f~~ld of 
direct taxation is found in a  general  provision (Article 100) ... 
2  tho  Com:'lliu:iion to make  proposnla  for .the  approximation· ot'  thos~ iogai 'p:'ovi.:..:: 
aio:J.s  of. !·!ember.  States which di~eotly affect .tho  oatablishment or funotioni 
of the C.om:non  l·larkoh.  So  there is no  doubt  tho.t  Article 100 
harmonization of direct taxes.  ' .•. 
It seems  olea.r,  however,  from the marked difference behmen the a.t'tittd.e ·to 
harmonization of indirect taxes on the one  hand and o£ direct taxes on the 
other that the autbofa ol the Tl'eaty regarded the_.hnrmoniza.ttoa of turnover 
taxes  and excise duties .as a  matter of primary importance  •.  The  COII'u'llission 
has,  therefore,  from the very outset  given  top priority ~o the harmonization  .  . . .  '.  .  .• 
of' indirect taxes  1  and turnoirer ·ta-xes· i.n particular.  ·  ·. 
·-··  •  t 
. 
·3.  The  Resolution of the Council  and  of the representatives 
of the  ~£ember· States of 22  lofarch  1971  on the achievement of econo:uic  and 
tary union confirmed the principle whereby,  at the  end of the process  leading 
to this union,  the  Co~~unity is to constitute an area within wnich not only 
goods  and  ~erv~ces but also persona  and capital will move  freely and without 
,- distortion of competition  •  . 
The  problems  to. be 
mainly to taxation 
solved in the field -of· direct taxation therefore relate 
of capital  move~';;ii~  (European· capital market)  and tha 
·removal  of fiscal barriers h,indering links and mergers between fims of 
different  l•lember  States  (European industrial policy). 
4.  Sinc.e  we  are aiming at  economic  and moneta.l'Y.  union,  taxes must more 
.  -·  . 
be  o<>nsidered  from  the P.oint  of view of'  economic  management  at the Conu:tunit;r  .  .  . 
· .level.  Compared to M:ernbers  States' budgets the size of the  Community budget 
is rather smallJ  the potential of the Community budget  cannot. forth~ time  . 
being  pl~y a  decisive role in stabilisation and structural policies,  which 
. will therefore have to be done  by means  or' coordinating national policies.  .  .  . 
improve-coordination,  nation-3.1  fiscal  instruments will have to 
and  Co~~unity instruments created. 
For that  reason,  certain areas of taxation may  have to be 
cess of harmonization,  quite apart  from  the aspect  of free movement  of pro-
ducts  a~i factors  of production. 3,.  Lol''rn.~. ,~ow ~~~lin!! -,at  }~ast  ;l~r. the  DJ~ii\ ff,'Jlds  of, 'tax  harmoni.~ation ~·· tb(J: 
. prog;i-e·ss  achieved  untlt:.~oda.y and .the  fu~ure  p~·ojectf.'l. ·  At  tho .same  tim~·-.~~·. ·  .. 
po!J~i~l~ptoo~eqtfvll elements in these arona 
~  "·  - .  .  '•  . 
.  .. 
however,  like to begin with some  ota.tiotics 
bot1-:een  the to.,'t  structures' of the EO-countries 
II.  Ta:~e  tr~ruo-tu.ros  in EC; and .US 
• • 
.Europa!Ul  oountries are. high tax c.ount:des  compared.  to. the U~ite~ States:  In 
lthe US  tot~ t~  revenue came  to 27 .17" per  ~ent··~f GNP,  c~mpared to Italy 31 per  ·. 
oent,  Gerna.."ly  34.5 per oent, !Jelgiwn1  France and United Kingdom  nearly 35.5  per~ 
· oont  and  Den::1a.rk  44  f.  (Table 1 ),  ...  ·  · 
.If we  oo:npa.re  the taxes  on· income  and profits ("direct taxes") .as 8.  percentage 
ONP  between the Unitsd States,  coming. to 13  %,  ,and the EC  Z.!ember  Statest  we  are  .. 
. 1 getting rather siC!ilar .figures:  United Kingdom,  Netherlands. Ein,d: I;u.xer.ibourg to. 
l'\- 1·3,5,  De:t.'llark  lq.6,  Belg~um and Germany 10- 11,:  with the 
l'&:t'o~nte:ges of  5.5  e~c!l for France  and Italy (Table  2)~  .. 
..  .  .  ~,~, 
In fact,  t!l.2.  European countries  impose  a  heavier tax' burden overall 
peoples :beca.use' their taxes on goods  and services  ("indirect taxes") as a  per-. 
1  centage of  GNP  are much  higher than in the United States. (Table 3). 
The. differences become  even more  marked  ~heri one  compares the ratios of general"  ..  . 
taxes  ~n ccnstL-nption  wi:t;h!llost  EC..;.c.ountries  coming~to 4  - 8  %  and the U~ted. 
States to just 1.  7 %  (TablE!  4). 
! 
One  last co:nparison:  the importance ·of taxes on corporation cinoome  as a  percen..;. 
'  tage of GUP is not very much  different between the US  and the EC:  ·US  come  to 
2.9% and"tne majority of the European countries to 2-3% (Table 5) • 
.' 
~ ... 
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Table  1: 
Total tax revenue 
as  ~of GNP  {l} 
(including social 
security) 
19h  -
Dcnrnark ·  43.99 
··.  .. 
Netherland~  42.20. 
United Kingdom  35.65 
France  35.62 
Belgium  35.22 
Germany  34.46 
Luxembourg  .  -34.10 
Ireland  31 .. 54 
Italy  30.92 
United States  21·11 
2: 
)fain individual tax r~venues 
as  ~ of'GNP 
Goodo  nnd  Scrvicoo 
14.7 '  16.~  ~  .  . 10.5 
-~3.4 
10~4  13.4 
' 
13 •. 0  5.6 
12.3  'l0.2 
·.10.4·  10.3 
7·5'  13.0 
14.9  .  7.6  I. 
il.o  !··.'  5.5 
5.4  ._13.0 
·'  . 
. 
:Table 3: 
as: 
Goods  nnd  Service::~  Income  ,  ...  ~ ••w•••c.· 
39.6  44.9 
27.2  .  34-7 
30.0 
: 36.3 
36.8 
30.8 
·22.7 
52.1 
38.5  18.3 
19.5 '·.  47.4 
' 
. 
~~ 
.: 
(1) This  and the followin& tables  :  Revenue  Statistics of OECD  l(ember  Countries, 
i'ica.tion.  · · ·  .·  .  ··  · 
·. 
.. 
'·. \,:. 
·,, 
'{ 
Denmark 
1 
\  Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
France 
:Belgium 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Italy 
United States 
•  ........  .. 
. . 
'• 
General  taxes  .• ori .Coils'W!Iption  _  as" of.GNP  ·  · · 
1.7() 
: 
., 
I  ..  • 
~ 
-~ 
..  2.1 
-~-5 
1.5 
5.2 
1~7 
2.1 
.2.9 .  ,  .  .......... 
T 
I 
. :  l. Tho  only ;:mjo:- achievement  in tax harmonization to date has been the  intro-
., 
duction of VJ..T  in all l·!ember  States.  'l'ho  national  ta.x revenue structures he.vo 
not  been cha..".ged  by the introduction of VAT1  becauno  14ember  S·tates have  chosen 
normally tho. rite or tho rates of VAT  which  brought  the same  revenue  as the  . .  . 
former  consu::tpi:ion  ta.xcs.  Tllis move  towards  tax harmonization has certainly 
not  been  e.  hind'3rancq to Alnerican  goods  in EC  markets  .• 
Future plans  for VAT  harmonization:  Pursuant  to a  Council decigion of  .  ' 
1970 on replacing the  Member  States•  financial contributions by the  Communities 
j  ,_.  . . 
OWn  resources,  a  major step forward towards  ~thor harmonization of the VAT-
systems will have to be  ta.~en;  In accordance  1vi th Article 4 of this decisioil, · 
part of the  Co"~~".ities'  own  resources will be pbtained by applying a  rate,  .  ~ 
not to excei!d  1  per cent,  to a  basis of assessment  fixed unit'orml1)for ·the 
l4ember  States according to Communit;r  rules.  The  Commission  presented a  draft · 
Directive  o~ this subject to the Council  in June  19731  which has not yet been 
I  '• 
.  adopted by the  Co~~cil.  No  discrimination for American  goods  and services 
, 
arl,se out  of this second step of VAT  harmonization. 
The  nerl ste-;>  of ta.x harmonization in tl1e .. field of VA,T  should be - as 
by the Commission - an abolition of the system of taxation of imports and 
,refunds on exports  in intra-Community trade.  The  abolition of "tax frontiers"· 
. is much  more  a  political objective than a  pure  economic aim.  It has to be 
seen as a  long-term measure.  There are two  main alternatives to reach this 
objective.  First, the harmonization of the level and the numbers  of VAT-
rates, an  ~pera.tion whic~ c~uld be carried out  in stages.  ·once tha.tax rates 
have  been sufficiently aligned,  it would be possible in intra-Community trade 
to abolish all the 'checks  and VAT  formalities at the  internai frontiers. 
The  second-~ternative would  be~ step-by-step abolition of tax frontiers, 
beginning  ~o.-ith.  those  intra-Community: transactions .of goods  and s.ervices  .. 
where  free :::ovement  is :possible without  a  planned harmonization of rates. 
VAT  techniqu!!  m!!.kes  this possible - at least for transactions betl'i'een taxable 
persons  in dif:fere:tt  i·lember  States. 
.;. ..  .  , 
Application of VAT  in inhu-Coimnunii:y tro.do COLLltl  be  basccl on tho principl(( 
that  ·the  co;:,bined.  teX'l•ftorios  of tho !·!ember  Stu-tes  form  ono  single area in-· 
volvinJ the  SU;J;:Jly  of goods  between l·lember  States and the supply of'  servi~es : 
withitl the  Co;:~;nu.'lity Hou:J.d  then be treated as  business  done  within one  count~ 
the ta:r.a'ole  poraon supplying the goods  or the  ~ertrices; Hho  is subject to  VAT 
in one  !·!e:nber  State,  1-rill  invoice the  amo~t  ·of· tax owed  in that Member  State_, 
l~hile the  p'.I!'Chaser  of the goods  or  ben~f~ciaryof' the scrvioe 'ltho  has  to pay 
tax in another He;nber  State may  deduct  the.· amount  froin  his tax liability. 
If such an action  ~1ere taken,· the  ~a:x: burden on  good~ an~ .se.tvicea  would .be 
eXa.ctly the same  as  before.  There. wo~d be· n'(i  change in  intra~ommunity 
competitiveness. 
•  ..  \. 
·;,,: 
Direct  io;;>orts  would1  Qf  co)lrsei  be taxed  wi~h the. internal ,VAT,r~tEI'..::. ail 
before.  Fo.r  those  transa.ct:io~"tax froll,tiers" would remaj_n .in  force  (mainly 
for travellers),  To  ease this ;- Jl9lHicai1y --:  ;a.th~r unsatisfa~:t~ri situa..:.: 
tion,  certain tax e:cemptions  for travellers p.r~ 'iLlrea.d.y  pel'lilitted totl.ay,;  . 
...  .  .  .  .  -·  .  ·_.  : i  .'  '  ..  : ·.: .  .  ':  . 
Other proposals are in discussion {facilities  fo~ small,,packages. etc.}, 
.  .  . 
The  abo!ition  <?t: border tax adjustments mey  lead to a-diffe-rent~-.. ··----
shcu:ing of VAT  revenue  between Nembir ·states  accor~ing to the surplus/deficit .  .  . 
situation of their trade balances and the differences of VAT  rates, 
to adhere to the principles of allocation of VAT  receipts to the .State of 
consumption one  could  envisage a  system of clearing between the Membe:t"  States···. 
with a  view to cor.tputing the amount  of VAT  collected in the  .. countr.r ~f  QI-igi~:.:• 
.  .  .  .  '  '.  •.  :  ·'. 
and allocating it as  aCCUfately as  possible to the country of clestinati;n. 
2.  Issue of Border Tax Adjustments 
.. ·  .. 
There is a long standing' belief in the United States that because of the 
importance of general taxes on  consumption in the  EC  (forrne~ly· in the  form 
turnover 1;axes,  today in the form. of value added ta.xes),  AffiP-rican  goods suffer 
unfair discrimination in EC.markets.  Relevant statements are often contused 
and misleaiing-.  Uorme.lly the  difference bet1-1een  border taxes 
adjustm9nts  is .not  suff'igiently stressed.  A border ta.x  (like a  customs  duty) 
.f. !1 'tnx. imposed  Hhcn  eood:;  oranG  nn  lntarnationa.l bordol't  and. as 
damaging to intcmational trade and thcrcf;ro to ·the  achievement  or the  < 
economic  bonefita of international specialisation and divioion of labour.~ 
A bor,1or  tax nd iustm'lnt  in an adjustment  of taxes already Jmpoeed  on  <~- pro-
•  I  ' 
ducc:r  whenever the goods  he  produces  erose  an  internntiono.l  bord.el:'  ··r  its 
purpose being to equalize the conditions of competition  bet1~een dom~stio and 
foreign producers  - 1  and thus  permit  comparative costs to govern trade 
patterns so that  t,he  economic  benefits of  internat~ono.l specialisation can 
be realized.  :Border  tnx adjustmento are therefore' compatible,  whereas  bot:der · 
taxes are  incompatible with efficiency in the use of the  ~orld 1 s rcsou.roes.  · 
f  '  .  ...~·  •  •  '  ......... 
;,.,  . •. 
You  proba"bly do  not .expect  from  me  today. a.  thorough analysis of the subject  · 
"Tax s'tJ;'uctures and the balance  of payments",  a  subject 1-rhfcli !i'as--·-. ---
.  . 
kept students,· tax administrations  and especially international· organizations 
bu.Syfor many years.  Both the  GATT  and the  OECD  have  made  extensiva inquiries 
into ·the  trade effects of  the VAT;  and both concluded that the tax was 
and did not  distort competition between exports  and  imports • 
•• 
.  ,  I 
Historically tax policy and the resulting tax structures are based upon 
prevailing viet~S.. of equity,  the pattern of expenditure benefitst sta"bilizing 
effects  1  contribution to growth,  eta: ··  Internal tax' policy in Europe is cer-
tainly not  influenced inherently by balance of payments  considerations or by 
protectionist aims  toti'irds  third countries. 
· In this context,  the introduction of a  VAT  system according to the first and 
second VAT-directive of 1967  in all nine l·fember  States,  a  process which has 
been concluded in April 1973  with Britain introducing VAT,  has been a  very 
• •  important anti-protectionist measure.  This  is true·because most  continental 
turnover. ~axes had been so designed that it 1-ras  impossible. to identify the 
exact  a.moun:t  of tax that is imposed  on  domestic  goods  and thus  identify the 
export  rebate and compensatory duty at the border.  In such cases, it------
is  relatively more  conveni<J;r:tt  to consciously overcompensate  imports  and ex,:.·::-
ports than when  the tax is identifiable and the protection more  obvious.  For 
this reason,  the decision of the European Communities to shift  from  the gross 
turnover tax, :l>'hose  design prohibits precise adjustments  to  the VAT  whose 
•  J  - •  •'  '  I 
effect is similar to a  retail sales tax and as such easily identified, has  , 
eliminated l>'lw.tever  use has  been made  of the destination principle for pro-· 
tectionist purposes.  This  is true for border tax adjustments  between l·!ember 
.f. . .  .  , 
nnd  a  third coun'try.  Because  of ·those 
reaeona· .other E\u.•opcnn  countries,  11hich  ere. not  mom bora  of tho EC,  like 
Aubt:Ha.1  tloNiay1  and  Sliedc.m,  adopt  eel  the V  ,\.'l'  system also  • 
.•. 
The  "bord·ol'  tax. ndjus·tment-controveray" has been placed by the United ''"'""""' 
not  only in tho context of the balance of payments  question as  a.  short  .  . 
corn {especinlly in tho years 1968-1972),  but  also in the ccinte:ct  of equity 
requirements  for international trade in the long run. 
0  •! 
European tax harmonization,  the  often -quoted:· US  policy measures 
rized as  follows  =-· 
- The  US .. should rebate certain indirect ta:<es  presently not  rebated. 
taxes are usually levied at the state and.  local level in the form  of reta.~i 
sales taxes  (with rates of generally 3 f,,  but  occasionally 4.5 or 6  %  at 
the state level and at county and city level an additional rate of 1  - 2  --- .  --
It has been estimated that the average of thesl!  indirect taxes is about  2 
3 per cent  of export sales prices. 
- Another solution might  be  a  c)lange  from  US  reliance  on  income taxes in fa•. 
.  -
vour of the adoption of a  general tax on  cons~-Rption (VAT).  "If the 
States cannot  liok_,the  systel!l,  perhaps it should  join it.". 
It is,  however,  quite uncertain - as some  studies are pointing out 
such a  changeover would  positively affect the international 
of US  products  abroad. 
Should future  supplementary tax resources,  needed for more  public  needs~  '.  , 
come  rather from  a. new  VAT  or from  an  increase of, say,  personal income 
taxes? 
. lloth possibilities  ~1ould probably be  influenced ·from the domestic 
mucl].  _!!!~re  than  from  the international aspects. 
- Negotiations  fer  changes· of GATT  rules with regard to .the  justification of. 
border tax adjustments. for direct taxes also. ·. 
likely to  bo  eligible  for  bordor  a<ljuatm~o.ts 
coroorate. income  taxes,  Ap~rt altos-other  from  the numerous  problerns  "'""'"''"'  ..  '  '  '  .  '  .  -
ted with  this appi'O!ICh  (degreo of chifting of corporation ta.xes, 
,  .  '  '  .  ' . 
.ti•1o 'problems  etc.), such o.  ooluhon might  not  Mcomplif,lh  muoh.fol' .tria 
State$ in that effective corporate  income  tax rates in the  US  d~. not d.if 
much  from  corpor~:~.tion tax rAtes· in major  Europenn  countries, 
- The  United States might  ask for a  renagotiation of GATT  rules 
preVEmt  border ·tax adjustments  for indirect taxes,  especially VAT,  . or a.t 
least to seek a  stan~~till arrangement  with the Community  countries nat 
increase "border taxes" in case ·of an  incr~lilse in .VAT  rates.  These  VAT 
rates applied to ..imports  (l·thich ·  a.'r~;  of  cours~, alltays  the same  as those 
applied to similar products  within the  countries} are of no 
soever,  because  a  higher or lo•,ter rate on goods  imported is 
tically on the level applying  ~ti thin the country at the next ta.-v.:ation  stage 
("effet  de  ratt:rapage'').  Tax  adjustment  on  imports  by taxable persons 
would  accordingly not  be  necessary.  ·Trade patterns, too,  t~ould not  be 
fluenced.  I 
IV.  Excise duties 
.  ' 
The  Council  adopted a  Directive on the harmonization of the structure 
excise duties  on manufactured tobacco on  19  December  1972. 
first Counoil decision in the field of harmonization of excise duties  •. 
now  outline the main characteristics of the general  program of excise duty· 
harmonization.  .  . 
1.  Progr~~  of excise duty harmonization 
On  1 March  1972 the  Commission  proposed that the excise· duties on the 
products  should be  maintained and  harmonized~ 
- mineral oils 
.' 
- manufactured tobaccos 
- alcohol 
- beer 
- wine 
... aim  of h!tl·monha.tion  in this fii.lid is tho • free •nove:. 
mont  of goods  bet11cen  J.lember  States  1  and  this HHhollt 1:\ny  distortion of corn~ 
titian, the other  c~oise dutioe  should be  gr£1-dua.lly  abol~shed.  ThC;J  !'.ember 
. State~  I  ho·  .. u!Ver,  shall rc·tain tho o.bility to maintain· or  ~yen to intrQduce 
now  duties  provided they do  not  involve,  in trade bot1;een !·!ember  States, borl 
.dClr  tmc adjustments.  It will, of course,  be  possible later on  to establhh, 
nt Co:01:ounity  lov'el 1  other excise cluties. 
On  7  ~~ch 1972  also,  the Commission  submitted to.tho Council several 
directives  on  structural harmonization of wine,  spirits and bear excises  •. ·  .  . 
·9  .August  1973 a  dra£t directive in the  fiel~  .. of duties. on mineral oils .ha.s  . ' ...... 
.  been~ submitted to· the  Cou.nci~. · · 
harmonization of the.structure of the .five excise duties will be 
(lchieved1 it will most  certainly be  nece!jsary to arrive' at 
ment  of ra.tes.  This,  again1  will be a  long-term objective  • 
.. 
I .  . 
Directive of 19 December  1972 a  first 
lias  beenfixod,colrering the period from  1  July 1973 to 1 July 1975. 
this first stage of harmonization  ~ational and iniported cigarettes will be 
subjected-to a  propoz-tional excise duty calculated on the  ma.ximUQ  retail 
ing price, and to  a  specific excise. duty calculated  .. periiii.f·('oithe-·p""r;....od  .  .c....:l;t:....ct-'-.~ 
't  •  •  .  • 
. Within certain lil!lit11  the  !~ember states are free to choose  one or the other· 
kind of cigarette taxation.  These limits have  been fixed in such a  way  that 
th.e specific ex:c1se  duty element will not  be lower .than 5 fa  nor higher than'  .  .  . 
75  <f.  of the aggregate amount  of excise duty on cigarettes.  It has been · 
• •  agreed in the same  Directive that at the final stage of harmonization· of  .  .  .  . 
structures  1  the same  ratio shall be established for. cigarettes in all !-!ember  '; 
States between the proportional excise duty and the specific excise duty. · ··-
The Directive also lays  down  certain general :Principle!! for the step-by-step · 
harmonization of the tobacco duty,  the grouping of manufactured tobacco. 
(cigarettes,  cigars,  smoking tobacco etc.)  ~~d tax collection. 
.;  . 
..  · •  > 
AlNo.dy at  nn  early otago of the diu  cuss iori of ·the  propooa.ls 
thb field,  the United States exprousod  oonoern about  thO  possible nega:ti\til 
cffec'~oS Of lll\Ch  an harmonization on their exports  Of  tobaCCO  into the 
especially to Oorillany.  In 19'{21  60  per cent  of tho  Corrununi'ty' 11  imports 
·, 
imported by Germany.  This leaf is used to produce high 
more  expensive  cigare·t.tes containing e.bout  50 
T'ne  current  ta:c split in Germany  is 75  per cent specific 
cent ad Vlllorem. 
The  higher the.proportiona.l (or acl.  valorem)  part of the 
· rettes  1  the more  cigarette producers  are - ~.? the A(nerican·argumimt  runs - · 
encouraged to prod1;1ce ..  cigarettes 'from  cheap tobaccos.  Therefore it is in 
Americ~~ interest that the speoifio excise duty will be relatively high· at 
the final stage of harmonization of the structure of the tobacco duties. 
Today it is1  however,  not  possible to foresee such  a  final rat1o1 
harmonhation  );~ill  take place in several stages,  where the experhnces of 
stage will have  to be  seen in the light of'the aims  of.the 
zatio..'l 1  which .are mainl.y the  openin!l"  of the national markets  in the Communit;y  .  .  .  . 
towards  a  free mciveme;nt  of. tobacc9 products 
I  do  not propose to  go  in~o all the ilspects of tliis c.omplicated problem. 
would,  l:towever1  like to repeat  for this field of harmonization also that 
·  !  has  n~wer been an intention to  di.~criminate against US  tobacco products. 
is clear that  such kind of structural  harmo~izatiort may  lead to  oh~es in 
patterns of trade with 1;Iembers  of the 
products will most  probably be  even more  attractive .to 
'because  of changing consumer tastes  • 
..... 
.  .• 
Virtually no  progress  has  been· achieved in the field of direct taxation. 
TaXa.tion  obstacles are undoubtedly one  of the main factors hinderin!l" the. cro.ss 
frontier restructurations of companies.  For this reason;  as early as January 
1969,  the  Commission  forwarded to the Council two  proposals for directives on 
.f.· ..  .  , 
. the tnxat1oi1  aystom applicable to  comprudeo  ili  tuatccl in different !•!ember  States 
(tii.Y.J.tion  of morgoro  e.nd  pru;•ont-subsidiary comp.:mios ),  '!'he  Council,  however, 
hll.ll  not yet ruled on thia matter,  which  becwna  sHlJ. more  oo;llplica.ted 
of the  onlargor.umt  of the Community, 
In ita program  for the  ha:rrnonization  of direct taxes  of  26  June  19671 
aion suggested a  general tnx on company profits  1  having the same  structure 
throuahout  the  Community  and based on broadly similar. me·thods  of assessment 
rat  ea. 
· 
1 
According to the nesol_':ti'!n of 22  March :1971  on  EN!J  it is envisaged to 
- certain types of t~x which might  have  a  direct effect on capital movements' 
within the Community,  and in particular withholding taxes on interest  on 
and on  dividendsJ 
structure of. company taxation, 
There are three basic systems of taxing companies  and their shareholders, 
Examples  of .eadh are to  be  found  in at least one  E~ country:  the two-rate 
(or split-rate) system,  the  imputation system and the classical (or separate) 
system. 
Under the classical system,  \~hich is practised 'in the' Netherlands,  Lu.zembourg, 
Denmark,  Italy (since January 1974)  and i.n  the. United States,· the  C'>l'1'oration,' 
.:  .  . 
tax on  company profits is regarded as a 'completE!ly different ta·.  ""om  the  ..  \'  . 
·. personal  inco:ne tax which .shareholders have to pa.y  on dividends  l  • . :eived.; 
Under this system,  no  tax relief or only little tax relief (like the u.s. 
100 ;{  .d~duction for shareholders} is given to the shareholder to take account  .. 
··  ··  - ~en  ·  . 
of the fact that the profits out  of which he has;paid have already· borne 
corporation tax.  This is sometimes  known  as  "economic double taxation", 
Under the two-rate system,  practised in Germany,  undistribute.d· profits are 
taxed at a  higher rate on the grounds that this is the final tax while 
distributed profits are taxed at  a  much  lower.rate,  on the grounds that the 
dividends  paid are  going to be  subject to further tax in the  hands  of the· 
shareholders. 
.f. Unc:J:e:r  the imputation syatem  (France,  United Kingdom,  pnrtially Belgium)  pro-
fits a.re  ta."<:od  at the swne  rate 11hethar diatdbutcd or not,  but  slw.reholdcrs 
Ncei\'O  an  imput01tion  credit  (or a.n"nvoir  fiscal" aa it ia  kno;m  in France) 
which  i~ effect reduces their own  trJ.X  burden.  .  .. 
I  do  not  propose to go  into all the domestic pros and cons of these 
sYstems. 
The  Co:~::lission opted. for .the  imp~tation system aa· a  harmonized ColliCitmity 
System  on lTovembar  21,  1973  and w1,ll  make  concrete proposal.s in the cours& 
•..  . .  \  of 1974. 
The  Com::tission  favours  the  imputat.ion system mainly for domestic reasons: 
is more  neutral in respect of the various methods  of financing  fi~s;· 
is more  neutral  in respect of the different  ~egal 
..  .. 
- it has many positive aspects  in respect of fiscal  law; 
- it providos  less  incentive for very rich tax payers to. avoid p~ng  ta.ices 
by in•renting' fictitious companies..; 
- it is  a.ls~ likely to br;i.ng on to the shares market  savers with av&r!!ge  or 
even modest  incomes. 
.  .. 
It has been explicitly acknowledged that there wiil be problems  ~f vatiotis  .-· 
.  .  - - .  ~ 
kinds to,_ avoid international and intra-commimi  t;z:  discriminations  if'~ capital 
or  inco~e flowa  across frontiers.  . 
The  ColliCiission  is presently examining appropriate solutions. 
A truly harmonized imputation system should,  of course,  not  lead to distor-
tions  in the EC-share markets -.there should be not tax incentives to invest 
in companies  of certain l·!ember  States  from  the  point  of view of' shareholders. 
Concerning shareholders whose  place of residence is outside the Co:nmunity the 
Commission is in favour ot: se·ttlintr these cases within the context  of: Double 
.'raxation Agreements. 
.f. .. 
2.  \·lithh,ld.i:lr('  t~~s for intoroat  pa;vmo:tts  and international cnoital 
It' we  connidm•  interest on bomls  oololy in tlio  light of tho Cor.unllJlitY  capit 
markot  ad. of tho  cos·t  of finanoin,!r fims  1  then the best solu'Hon ia the 
abolition of r.uty  deduction a.t  sou.rce.  B'lt  this is incompa.tiblo with the 
require:;,enta  of'  fiacal  1oM  antl  rtms  collJlter .to the efforts baing made  by the 
Cor..':tio3ion,  in coop'3ra.tion Hith  !·!ember  States,  and by the  OECD 1  to stop tax 
£rnuds and evasions. 
.  . 
Hot~avor 1  ~o make  a!t  irnporta.~t step forward in fiscal law and to ta.lte 
of the preoccupations of a  social' nature  which ltere ·so n\ucli" in evidence at  . . .... 
the Paris  SUJnr.lit 1  1-1<3  must  choos.e  to make  it the general practice to levy 
substantial deductions at source  {about  25  %) •.  Although the Commission his 
declared-itself to  be  in  principl~ in· favour. of substantial deductions at 
source,  :!.t  noted that to apply such a  measui-e  in the  present  circllr'..stances 
would  give rise to a  drain of capital  from  the Community.  · Under these  co~ 
ditions,  the Commission is of the opinion  ~hat this measure  cannot  be brought 
into ef:'ect un'til the Community has established m~chineJ;;v fo:t: _2o~troll~ng __ 
movements  of capital at its  erlernal frontiers.  The  Council in the Resoltltion 
on  the  i!:!ple:nentation ot· a  second phase of Economic  and  ~Ionetaey Union has  . 
recently decided that such mc;.chinery  should be  es~ablished and inVited the 
Commission to submit  a  proposal· for that  and before 31  December 1974. 
The  Com.uission is endeavouring to subr.tit to the Counoil1  also before 
. draft directive concerning tlithholding tax on bond interest. 
VI.  International ta::c  evasion 
• •  Let  me  now  say something about  international tax evasion. 
The  ~xrope~~ Co~"unity is faced  with this problem  both in the'field of capital 
investment and insofar as it affects the competitiveness of business.  The  .. 
Commission  expressed its political ·view of this matter in its report of the 18th 
June last  on  ''Holding Companies"  and more  recently in its report  on Multinational 
Companies. 
.f. 
15 ..  ., 
.  . 
Tho  aop.wato  asp()cts  of this matter include 
(  o.)  int  ornationa.l  t!J..lt  control 
(b)  ta.."<  avoidance 
(c)  tl•anof'cr  of profits 
.. 
(c.a)  International tn.:x:  control must  be  organiued;  11:t  Community  level, to 
international ·ta.JC  fraud through a  system of cooperation betwegn the to.x 
authoriths  o.t:  r.lember  States. 
The  aim must  be an exchange  of. information between l•lember  States which. 
'  .  .  .. ·- --- -~-- -~----- .... 
would  be appropriate to a  real.  c.~l?n Jl!a.x-ket. · 
,.,  .... --- .,,.,•,--,-· oo••OOoOO  0  ''A- 0  •••  •••-··-··-.. -·~-··  ·-·-·-·  .. -- -- .. 
(bb)  Tax  avoid~~ce  (~mich is not  nec~esarily illegal, like tax fraud) 
in having inco:ne  collected by a.  eo-called ''base-company",  es.tablished in 
tax haven  and therefore subject to very little or no taX. at all.  Several . 
types  of  ba~c-companies can be distinguished depending on the different  .  .  . 
categories of income  collected:  companies holding patents,  fi~ancing 
companies,  purchasing and sales  companies,  property management 
companies  providing services,  etc. 
(cc)  Concerning the problem of transfer of profits,  normally the authorities 
the countr-J from  Which  the profits have been transferred tend to adjust 
these profits upl<ards  on the principle that pric.?s  betl<een  comp~'lies in 
.same  ~cup must  be  fixed·· as if the  tra.nsa,ctions  were  effect.ed between inde-
pendent  persons  (dea~ing at  arm's  length clause) but, very' often, the autho-
rities do  not have all the detailS  needed to' adjust the  price  I  particularly 
where several  companies  are involved successively in the  same transaction. 
'  So at, Community level it is necessary to intensify cooperation bshteen the 
national e.uthori ties  in order to uncover these profit transfers.  This 'is 
the  problem of international tax controls mentioned earlier, but, to m~~a 
such cooperation  between the tax administrations  of the different  countries 
worl-'..able,  it is again necessary to apply the  principle of "dealing at arm!s 
length".  There are,  however,  inherent difficulties in applying this prin-
ciple in practice.  The  real  problem  with which  we  are  faced is to establis · 
practical guidelines for the concrete application of this  principle 
tain situations as,  for instance,  you have done  in the u.s. .  '  ., 
1/II. 
.  . 
oo-oporntio:l \litlt e:cp•u·tn  from  tho J.rombor  Ste.·to~;.  Other intornntional orgc.niza..: 
tiono1  }lOt:.!bl;,·  the  OEGD  1uul  uven  tho  UU,  nro aloo  c1~agocl on  similar studieu 
bnt luwo  !lot,  as yet,  found  do fin  ito solution!!.  Accordingly,  •1e  in the 
Corr.mimlion  co•.tld  ~;ut  be e:cp9otod to precli.ot 11hcn  110  11ill be  in  a.  position to 
praoant  nolutionll to the  Co1mcil  or Hha.t  the nature of those·"solutiorts will be 
but I  have  to oophanise that  1~0  consider thio a  verJ urgent ma.tter. 
Hecen"!;  in~'lrna';iotml  tn..""<  rJroblcms  :  DISC 
.As  you kno:.,·,  the  t;:wc 'trea.tment  of Domestic Interna.tio'na.l Sales Corporations 
(DISC),  introduced into  US-legi~lntion.in DoceQber  1971 1  led to a  thorough 
~ 
examination of tho various trade  and·~~tion implications in European 
1 
countries and  in other "triuiinz  part~ers of the United States.  Even before 
the enactoent  of this new  tax scheme,  the  Co~~unity expressed its concern: 
about  these measures in a  note verba.le  on  October 5,  1971 1  to the fl.!llerican 
Government: 
"%e DISC  ta.:c  arrm'-6Cttent 1·/0uld  involve very considerable exemptions  fro::~  ·. 
direct taxes  on  profits and would be  such as to encourage exports artificially 
i  .• 
by reducir..g prices.  This exemption 1·1ould  be  incompatiple  ~lith the  com:~itments 
'  or  the United States ·under  the General Agreement  as regards export subsidies 
and would involve j;he  risk of serious disturbances in internationa:).. competition". 
The  DISC  statute allo1-1s  pr<l-ctically indefinite tax deferral on  5U/o  of profits 
:to America.'!  fir.:~s of ~1hich 95%  of their business are exports. 
• . 
. . . 
l-Ie  thin..lc  that  the DISC  legi~lation is not only in violation of GATT  .. 
(Article XVI  (4)),  but also  5.n  violation of"the international code of conduCt 
' . 
in fiscal matters•·  .. 
Concerning ?ATT,  the  Community  has invoked the procedures of Article XXIII  :  2 
of GATT,  designed to afford the  opportUnity for complaints to be examined on 
a  multilateral basis.  Bilateral discussions already took place  some  time ago. 
Tne  argu~ent of the  Co~~unity concerning a  violation of the international 
code  of conduct  runs as  folloHs:  EC  :Member  States have  concluded ta.:c  e,o-ree-
ments with -the  United Sta.te·s,  having been given assurances that  the more  or  . 
less total  reUiission of certain taxes,  which  ~1oulcl normally be  due under the •• 
.  ' 
I 
ntLtion~l lccislntions would  not  loud on  the sicle  of' tho US  to  exemption or 
,  certain  bcomc a.risin8' in Eul·opa.  DISCs,  hol·te.vor,  precisely create caoea  of 
OY.cmpHon  of a  kind  for which  i\0  provision  Wi!.B  mado  when  tbc  agre~f.H!n~S  were 
d.rn~"n up.  In order to avoid that DISC 'a are gaining an undue  advant'age, 
there no.y  ba  pressure on governments to review certain clauses of these agree-
ments  (a.  g.  definition or "permanent  cstabli'shment" in a  more  rcstrio·tive sen-
se). 
There is obviously a  certain danger that other countries will have  to adopt 
similat• tax rn.:1asurcs 1  a  oour·se  1~hich  1~ould be  damagi;tg  t~ WQrld  trade. 
VIII.  Conclusion3 
1. In the long run EloltJ  necessarily involves national governments  giving up 
sovereignty over fundamental  areas  of economic life:  the  exchange rate, the 
budgetary bal~tce and monetary management.  If the resulting situation was 
to be  made  tolprnble to the population of the Community, 'arrangements'would 
have  to be made  for the  EEG  at the centre to discharge the  functio:m  formerly 
' 
perfor~ed by the national govornmepts  in maintaining high levels of employ-
ment,  minim~~ standards for incomes  and adequate  industrial  co~petitiveness. 
Essentially this means  a  strong CommUnity  budget able to redistribute re-
sources  among  different areas  Hithin its borders  both to compensate  in the 
short  term  for differing levels of employment  and real incomes and to  improve 
·the long-ter:n  co::~petitiveness of the weaker areas  1~hich 1dll no longer have 
the exchange rate instrument  available to  t~em. 
To  achieve  the~e objectives the Community  will 'need to develop effective 
nue  and expenditure  policies.  Success,  however,'  would  certainly not  be 
achieved without  progress in the development  of effective 
particularly a  strengthening of the European Parl:Lament. 
2.  In the shorter term  we  are likely to  be  faced·with  a  situation in which 
matters  continue to be settled 011  the basis  of bargaining betwet-n national 
goverr.ments, and central authority will be  a  relatively weak  one·. 
.  . 
.  f. ....  1'(-
'r.ix:~t i.on  1: ill ::;-ofloct  tho (tifi'oroncuu in .nationo.l 
nituel io:;ll  n!ld  policicw.  At  tho }lreoont  I!IO~nont  H 
to define  1'-'l  econonically o.rtd  politically senoiblo 
iu pil.z•tioula.rly c1iffiol.\l i ···  .  .·  .  , 
Com1ounity  true  harnoniz~~:tion: 
·•  prosra.-:: - ,boc~uso tax ha:rmonizo:Hon  is not  il.n  end in itself', but  a."l  instrument 
that  sar·:es to pro::toto - and at the  sarno  tino to a  certain 'extent roflecto -
tho  pro~csu of economic,  social and political interrration,  and the future 
direotior.:.:  ar.d  require::1ents  of these objectives are unable to be readily do-
fined at this point. in Umo •. 
3.  TaA harconization policy does not ignore the outside world.  ~ae points of 
reference for European tax' poiicy.a~e 1 .Af course,  first of' all Community 
aspect:~.  But  no  systemat'io discrimination toNards Third Countries is intended.; 
More  f:::-oqt!ent  a.'1d  thorough discussions  amor~ the representatives of the  ·  .  . 
United States and the Europea."l  Community  dealing with international fiscal 
affairs could help to avoid misunderstandi.'lgs about  the  respecti~ ta:t philo-
sophies.  Existing international organizations should be the forum  for these 
talks.  tic 1·1elcome  the  initiative of former Secretary of the Treasury, 
John D.  Connall~ 1  presented in a  speech before the international Fiscal 
Association  in October 1971  in Hashiugton for "a continuing and heightened 
orga:tized e:"fort"  to deal  ~Ji th international fiscal affairs. (l) 
..... 
(l)For you::- ir~o~a.tion: 
In discussL'l6 the implications of EC  tax harmonization for the United States, 
Stanley S.  Surray,  forQer Assistunt  Secreta~J of  the Treasur,r,  in a  talk 
delivered b-:.fore  the  ~rational Industrial Conference Board,  lTew  York,  on 
15  Feb!'!W.rJ,  1968,  proposed a  "harmonization" of the EC-tax systems 'tdth 
those of the  United States.  "It means",  as !.rr.  Surray underlined,  "the 
process whereby national tax systems that mav·differ both in kind and in 
burdens  i::posed can coexist in the  ~1orld t·ri thout  creating difficulties :for 
each other •••  can coexist in harmoey."  Further 'on,  he  suggested that  . 
exploration in GA'IT  and in other ways  11 is needed to prese:t"TG  freedom of  .  · 
action for countries to establish their domestic tax systems and the 
distribution of their tax burdens in keeping l·rith their notions of economic 
gro\·lth a."'d  tax equity without at the sace  time prejudicing their inter---
national trade position.  ~ne essential question fs hm.,  mcy  countries which· 
desire to rely on  a  progressive tax structure or cmmtries which  do  no uish 
to place hea'rJ overall tax burdens on  their peoples,  and hence have no need 
for high rate sales taxes,  continue  in these domestic goals and still main-. 
tain  i~ their international trade full  c~Mpetitiveness with the ~1ropean 
COU."'tries  ~1hich have  a  different  domestic tax philosophy?  For st:re  1  a  bettar 
anm~er can be  found than that the rest of the  1~orld to protect its trade 
positio~ must  simply  emulate the Europeans and their domestic tax philosophic 
Hhateve:- r:.ey  be  the  impact  of that emulation on the tax systems and.  interm!.l. 
econo~ies of the other countries. 
The  United States - and the rest of the ~;orld - thus have  a  high stake in a·. 
:full exploratio!l of theoe  issu~s - issues Hhich are made  both more  pertinent 
end more  inporta.'lt by the proce:.s of tax hannonization in Europe." 